Formal and Informal Risk Sharing in LDCs: Theory and Empirical Evidence

Pierre Dubois, Bruno Jullien and Thierry Magnac

No 2842, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We develop and estimate a model of dynamic interactions between households where commitment is limited and contracts are incomplete to explain the patterns of income and consumption growth in village economies of less developed countries. Households can insure through both formal contracts and informal agreements, that is, agreements specifying voluntary transfers that need to be self-enforceable. This theoretical setting nests the case of complete markets and the case where only informal agreements are available. We derive a system of non-linear equations for income and consumption growth. A key prediction of our model is that both variables are affected by lagged consumption as a consequence of the interplay of formal and informal contracting possibilities. In a semi-parametric setting, we prove identification, derive testable restrictions and estimate the model with the use of data from Pakistan villages. Empirical results are consistent with the economic arguments. Incentive constraints due to self-enforcement bind with positive probability and formal contracts are used to reduce this probability.

Keywords: incomplete markets; contracts; risk sharing; informal transfers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C14 D13 D91 L14 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 48 pages
Date: 2007-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr and nep-dev
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

Published - published in: Econometrica, 2008, 76(4), 679-726

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Related works:
Journal Article: Formal and Informal Risk Sharing in LDCs: Theory and Empirical Evidence (2008)
Working Paper: Formal and Informal Risk Sharing in LDCs: Theory and Empirical Evidence (2008)
Working Paper: Formal and Informal Risk Sharing in LDCs: Theory and Empirical Evidence (2008)
Working Paper: Formal and informal risk sharing in LDCs: theory and empirical evidence (2008)
Working Paper: Formal and Informal Risk Sharing in LDCs: Theory and Empirical Evidence (2007)
Working Paper: Formal and Informal Risk Sharing in LDCs: Theory and Empirical Evidence (2007)
Working Paper: Formal and informal risk sharing in LDCs: theory and empirical evidence (2006)
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