A Theory of Employment Guarantees: Contestability, Credibility and Distributional Concerns

Arnab Basu, Nancy Chau and Ravi Kanbur

No 3002, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Both raw intuition and past experience suggest that the success of an employment guarantee scheme (EGS) in safeguarding the welfare of the poor depends both on the wage it promises, and the ease with which any worker can gain access. An EGS is thus at once a wage guarantee and a rationing device. We chart the positive and normative limits of such an EGS as an efficiency improving and poverty alleviating policy reform in a canonical labor market setting. At its core, an EGS provides an aggregate, not just EGS, employment target. Given the target, the EGS wage and access can be fine-tuned to deliver outcomes ranging from a contestable labor market to a simple universal unemployment benefit. The credibility of any such target, however, is shown to be triggered endogenously by a host of factors: the distributional concerns of the planner, private sector productivity, the prevalence of market power and the need for public works. Paradoxically, the outcome with a planner who cares only about efficiency can be less efficient than the outcome with a planner whose social welfare function also gives weight to poverty!

Keywords: distribution concern; employment guarantees; employment targeting; credibility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I38 J21 K31 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2007-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab and nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published - published in: Journal of Public Economics, 2009, 93 (3-4), 482-497

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp3002.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: A theory of employment guarantees: Contestability, credibility and distributional concerns (2009)
Working Paper: A Theory of Employment Guarantees: Contestability, Credibility and Distributional Concerns (2006)
Working Paper: A Theory of Employment Guarantees: Contestability, Credibility and Distributional Concerns (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3002

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().