Feedback in Tournaments under Commitment Problems: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Oliver Gürtler and Christine Harbring ()
Additional contact information
Christine Harbring: RWTH Aachen University

No 3111, IZA Discussion Papers from IZA Network @ LISER

Abstract: In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that in equilibrium the principal reveals intermediate information regarding the agents’ previous performances if these performances are not too different. Moreover, we investigate a situation where the principal is not able to credibly communicate her information. Having presented our formal analysis, we test these results using data from laboratory experiments. The experimental findings provide some support for the model.

Keywords: feedback; commitment problems; tournament; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D83 J33 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2007-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Feedback in Tournaments under Commitment Problems: The-ory and Experimental Evidence (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3111

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