Strategic Hiring Behavior in Empirical Matching Functions

René Fahr and Uwe Sunde

No 320, IZA Discussion Papers from IZA Network @ LISER

Abstract: This paper makes two contributions to the empirical matching literature. First, a recent study by Anderson and Burgess (2000) testing for endogenous competition among job seekers in a matching frame-work, is replicated with a richer and more accurate data set for Germany. Their results are confirmed and found to be surprisingly robust. Second, the matching framework is augmented by endogenous strategic hiring behavior on the side of vacancy-posting firms. Neglecting job competition, the relevance of strategic hiring is shown using the same empirical strategy. At the same time, the test is shown to be invalid if both types of endogenous behavior are present

Keywords: strategic hiring; Matching models; job search; vacancies; unemployment; job competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J41 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2001-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published - published in: Labour Economics, 2005, 12 (6), 773-780

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