Telling the Truth May Not Pay Off: An Empirical Study of Centralised University Admissions in Germany

Sebastian Braun, Nadja Dwenger and Dorothea Kübler

No 3261, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We investigate the matching algorithm used by the German central clearinghouse for university admissions (ZVS) in medicine and related subjects. This mechanism consists of three procedures based on final grades from school ("Abiturbestenverfahren", "Auswahlverfahren der Hochschulen") and on waiting time ("Wartezeitverfahren"). While these procedures differ in the criteria applied for admission they all make use of priority matching. In priority matching schemes, it is not a dominant strategy for students to submit their true preferences. Thus, strategic behaviour is expected. Using the full data set of applicants, we are able to detect some amount of strategic behaviour which can lead to inefficient matching. Alternative ways to organize the market are briefly discussed.

Keywords: strategic behaviour; university admissions; matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D02 D78 I29 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2007-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published - published in: B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy: Advances in Economic Analysis and Policy, 2010, 10 (1), Article 22

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Related works:
Journal Article: Telling the Truth May Not Pay Off: An Empirical Study of Centralized University Admissions in Germany (2010)
Working Paper: Telling the truth may not pay off: An empirical study of centralised university admissions in Germany (2007)
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