A Dynamic Analysis of the Demand for Health Insurance and Health Care

Jonneke Bolhaar, Maarten Lindeboom () and Bas van der Klaauw

No 3698, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We investigate the presence of moral hazard and advantageous or adverse selection in a market for supplementary health insurance. For this we specify and estimate dynamic models for health insurance decisions and health care utilization. Estimates of the health care utilization models indicate that moral hazard is not important. Furthermore, we find strong evidence for advantageous selection, largely driven by heterogeneity in education, income and health preferences. Finally, we show that ignoring dynamics and unobserved fixed effects changes the results dramatically.

Keywords: panel data; supplementary private health insurance; moral hazard; health care utilization; advantageous selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C33 D82 G22 I11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 53 pages
Date: 2008-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-hea, nep-ias and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published - published in: European Economic Review, 2012, 56 (4), 669-690

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Related works:
Journal Article: A dynamic analysis of the demand for health insurance and health care (2012)
Working Paper: A Dynamic Analysis of the Demand for Health Insurance and Health Care (2008)
Working Paper: A Dynamic Analysis of the Demand for Health Insurance and Health Care
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