A Dynamic Analysis of the Demand for Health Insurance and Health Care

Jonneke Bolhaar, Maarten Lindeboom () and Bas van der Klaauw

No 08-084/3, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: This discussion paper has led to a publication in 'European Economic Review' , 56(4), 669-90.

We investigate the presence of moral hazard and advantageous or adverse selection in a market for supplementary health insurance. For this we specify and estimate dynamic models for health insurance decisions and health care utilization. Estimates of the health care utilization models indicate that moral hazard is not important. Furthermore, we find strong evidence for advantageous selection, largely driven by heterogeneity in education, income and health preferences. Finally, we show that ignoring dynamics and unobserved fixed effects changes the results dramatically.

Keywords: supplementary private health insurance; health care utilization; advantageous selection; moral hazard; panel data (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C33 D82 G22 I11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea and nep-ias
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: A dynamic analysis of the demand for health insurance and health care (2012)
Working Paper: A Dynamic Analysis of the Demand for Health Insurance and Health Care (2008)
Working Paper: A Dynamic Analysis of the Demand for Health Insurance and Health Care (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20080084

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