Efficiency Gains from Team-Based Coordination: Large-Scale Experimental Evidence

Francesco Feri, Bernd Irlenbusch () and Matthias Sutter
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Bernd Irlenbusch: University of Cologne

No 3741, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: The need for efficient coordination is ubiquitous in organizations and industries. The literature on the determinants of efficient coordination has focused on individual decision-making so far. In reality, however, teams often have to coordinate with other teams. We present an experiment with 825 participants, using six different coordination games, where either individuals or teams interact with each other. We find that teams coordinate much more efficiently than individuals. This finding adds one important cornerstone to the recent literature on the conditions for successful coordination. We explain the differences between individuals and teams using the experience weighted attraction learning model.

Keywords: coordination games; individual decision-making; experience-weighted attraction learning; team decision-making; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C91 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pages
Date: 2008-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published - revised and extended version published in: American Economic Review, 2010, 100 (4), 1892-1912

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Related works:
Journal Article: Efficiency Gains from Team-Based Coordination—Large-Scale Experimental Evidence (2010)
Working Paper: Efficiency Gains from Team-Based Coordination – Large-Scale Experimental Evidence (2009)
Working Paper: Efficiency Gains from Team-Based Coordination - Large-Scale Experimental Evidence (2008)
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