Incentives and the Sorting of Altruistic Agents into Street-Level Bureaucracies

Margaretha Buurman () and Robert Dur
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Margaretha Buurman: Free University Amsterdam

No 3847, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Many street-level bureaucrats (such as caseworkers) have the dual task of helping some clients, while sanctioning others. We develop a model of such a street-level bureaucracy and study the implications of its personnel policy on the self-selection and allocation decisions of agents who differ in altruism towards clients. When bureaucrats are paid flat wages, they do not sanction, and the most altruistic types sort into bureaucracy. Pay-for-performance induces some bureaucrats to sanction, but necessitates an increase in expected wage compensation, which can result in sorting from both the top and bottom of the altruism distribution. We also show how client composition affects sorting and why street-level bureaucrats often experience an overload of clients.

Keywords: personnel policy; sorting; altruism; street-level bureaucracy; pay-for-performance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J3 J4 L3 M5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2008-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-lab and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published - published in: Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2012, 114 (4), 1318-1345

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Related works:
Journal Article: Incentives and the Sorting of Altruistic Agents into Street-Level Bureaucracies (2012)
Working Paper: Incentives and the Sorting of Altruistic Agents into Street-Level Bureaucracies (2010)
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