Revisiting Strategic versus Non-Strategic Cooperation

Ernesto Reuben and Sigrid Suetens

No 4107, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We use a novel experimental design to disentangle strategically- and non-strategically-motivated cooperation. By using contingent responses in a repeated sequential prisoners' dilemma with a known probabilistic end, we differentiate end-game behavior from continuation behavior within individuals while controlling for expectations. This design allows us to determine the extent to which strategically-cooperating individuals are responsible for the so-called end-game effect. Experiments with two different subject pools indicate that the most common motive for cooperation in repeated games is strategic and that the extent to which end-game effects are driven by strategically-cooperating individuals depends on the profitability of cooperation.

Keywords: strong reciprocity; strategic cooperation; conditional cooperation; reputation building (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D01 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2009-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cse, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published - published in: Experimental Economics, 2012, 15 (1), 24-43

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp4107.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Revisiting strategic versus non-strategic cooperation (2012)
Working Paper: Revisiting Strategic versus Non-strategic Cooperation (2009)
Working Paper: Revisiting Strategic versus Non-strategic Cooperation (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4107

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().