Preferences and Beliefs in a Sequential Social Dilemma: A Within-Subjects Analysis

Mariana Blanco, Dirk Engelmann, Alexander Koch and Hans-Theo Normann

No 4624, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Within-subject data from sequential social dilemma experiments reveal a correlation of first-and second-mover decisions for which two channels may be responsible, that our experiment allows to separate: i) a direct, preference-based channel that influences both first- and second-mover decisions; ii) an indirect channel, where second-mover decisions influence beliefs via a consensus effect, and the first-mover decision is a best response to these beliefs. We find strong evidence for the indirect channel: beliefs about second-mover cooperation are biased toward own second-mover behavior, and most subjects best respond to stated beliefs. But when first movers know the true probability of second-mover cooperation, subjects' own second moves still have predictive power regarding their first moves, suggesting that the direct channel also plays a role.

Keywords: consensus effect; experimental economics; social dilemmas (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2009-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

Published - published in: Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, 87, 122–135.

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Journal Article: Preferences and beliefs in a sequential social dilemma: a within-subjects analysis (2014)
Working Paper: Preferences and beliefs in a sequential social dilemma: A within-subjects analysis (2014)
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