The Performance of Performance Standards

James Heckman, Carolyn Heinrich and Jeffrey Smith

No 525, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: This paper examines the performance of the JTPA performance system, a widely emulated model for inducing efficiency in government organizations. We present a model of how performance incentives may distort bureaucratic decisions. We define cream skimming within the model. Two major empirical findings are (a) that the short run measures used to monitor performance are weakly, and sometimes perversely, related to long run impacts and (b) that the efficiency gains or losses from cream skimming are small. We find evidence that centers respond to performance standards.

Keywords: performance standards; reinventing government; evaluation; JTPA (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 62 pages
Date: 2002-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ifn and nep-ltv
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (76)

Published - published in: Journal of Human Resources, 2002, 37(4), 778-811

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Journal Article: The Performance of Performance Standards (2002)
Working Paper: The Performance of Performance Standards (2002)
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