Resisting Moral Wiggle Room: How Robust is Reciprocity?

Joël van der Weele (), Julija Kulisa (), Michael Kosfeld and Guido Friebel ()
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Joël van der Weele: Goethe University Frankfurt
Julija Kulisa: Goethe University Frankfurt

No 5374, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Several studies have shown that dictator-game giving declines substantially if the dictator can exploit situational "excuses" for not being generous. In this experimental study we investigate if this result extends to more natural social interactions involving reciprocal behavior. We provide the second mover in a reciprocal game with an excuse for not reciprocating, an excuse which has previously been shown to strongly reduce giving in dictator games. We do not find that the availability of the excuse has any effect at all on reciprocal behavior, and conclude that reciprocity is a more stable disposition than dictator game generosity.

Keywords: moral wiggle room; reciprocity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C9 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2010-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published - published in: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2014, 6 (3), 256-264

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