Are Nurses More Altruistic than Real Estate Brokers?

Karin Jacobsen (), Kari H. Eika, Leif Helland, Jo Lind and Karine Nyborg
Additional contact information
Karin Jacobsen: University of Oslo
Kari H. Eika: Royal Ministry of Health and Care Services

No 5721, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We report results from a dictator game experiment with nurse students and real estate broker students as dictators, and Amnesty International as the recipient. Although brokers contributed substantial amounts, nurses contributed significantly more, on average 76 percent of their endowment. In a second part, subjects chose between a certain repetition of the experiment and a 50-50 chance of costly exit. About one third of the brokers and half of the nurses chose the exit option. While generosity was indeed higher among nurses, even when taking exits into account, the difference cannot readily be attributed to different degrees of altruism.

Keywords: generosity; exit option; dictator game; occupational differences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D10 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2011-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

Published - published in: Journal of Economic Psychology, 2011, 32 (5), 818-831

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Related works:
Journal Article: Are nurses more altruistic than real estate brokers? (2011)
Working Paper: Are nurses more altruistic than real estate brokers? (2011)
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