Preferences for Consistency
Armin Falk and
Florian Zimmermann
No 5840, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Abstract:
This paper studies how a preference for consistency can affect economic decision-making. We propose a two-period model where people have a preference for consistency because consistent behavior allows them to signal personal and intellectual strength. We then present three experiments that study main predictions and implications of the model. The first is a simple principal-agent experiment that shows that consistency is valued by others and that this value is anticipated. The second experiment underlines the crucial role of early commitment for consistency preferences. Finally we show how preferences for consistency can be used to manipulate choices.
Keywords: early commitment; experiments; consistency preferences; charitable giving; social influence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D03 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2011-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-mic and nep-upt
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)
Published - published as 'A Taste for Consistency and Survey Response Behavior' in: CESifo Economic Studies, 2013, 59 (1), 181–193
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Related works:
Working Paper: Preferences for Consistency (2011)
Working Paper: Preferences for Consistency (2011)
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