Lies and Biased Evaluation: A Real-Effort Experiment
Julie Rosaz () and
Marie Claire Villeval
No 5884, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Abstract:
This paper presents the results of a laboratory experiment in which workers perform a real-effort task and supervisors report the workers’ performance to the experimenter. The report is non verifiable and determines the earnings of both the supervisor and the worker. We find that not all the supervisors, but at least one third of them bias their report. Both selfish black lies (increasing the supervisor's earnings while decreasing the worker's payoff) and Pareto white lies (increasing the earnings of both) according to Erat and Gneezy (2009)'s terminology are frequent. In contrast, spiteful black lies (decreasing the earnings of both) and altruistic white lies (increasing the earnings of workers but decreasing those of the supervisor) are almost non-existent. The supervisors' second-order beliefs and their decision to lie are highly correlated, suggesting that guilt aversion plays a role.
Keywords: self-image; guilt aversion; lie-aversion; lies; evaluation; experiments; deception (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D82 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2011-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-hpe, nep-hrm, nep-neu and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)
Published - revised version published in: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2012, 84 (2), 537-549.
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https://docs.iza.org/dp5884.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Lies and biased evaluation: A real-effort experiment (2012) 
Working Paper: Lies and Biased Evaluation: A Real-Effort Experiment (2012) 
Working Paper: Lies and Biased Evaluation: A Real-Effort Experiment (2011) 
Working Paper: Lies and Biased Evaluation in a Real-Effort Experiment (2011)
Working Paper: Lies and Biased Evaluation in a Real-Effort Experiment (2011)
Working Paper: Lies and Biased Evaluation in a Real-Effort Experiment (2011)
Working Paper: Lies and Biased Evaluation: A Real-Effort Experiment (2011)
Working Paper: Lies and Biased Evaluation in a Real-Effort Experiment (2010)
Working Paper: Lies and Biased Evaluation in a Real-Effort Experiment (2010)
Working Paper: Lies and Biased Evaluation in a Real-Effort Experiment (2010)
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