EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Lies and Biased Evaluation: A Real-Effort Experiment

Julie Rosaz () and Marie Claire Villeval ()

No 5884, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: This paper presents the results of a laboratory experiment in which workers perform a real-effort task and supervisors report the workers’ performance to the experimenter. The report is non verifiable and determines the earnings of both the supervisor and the worker. We find that not all the supervisors, but at least one third of them bias their report. Both selfish black lies (increasing the supervisor's earnings while decreasing the worker's payoff) and Pareto white lies (increasing the earnings of both) according to Erat and Gneezy (2009)'s terminology are frequent. In contrast, spiteful black lies (decreasing the earnings of both) and altruistic white lies (increasing the earnings of workers but decreasing those of the supervisor) are almost non-existent. The supervisors' second-order beliefs and their decision to lie are highly correlated, suggesting that guilt aversion plays a role.

Keywords: self-image; guilt aversion; lie-aversion; lies; evaluation; experiments; deception (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D82 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-hpe, nep-hrm, nep-neu and nep-soc
Date: 2011-07
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://ftp.iza.org/dp5884.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Lies and biased evaluation: A real-effort experiment (2012) Downloads
Working Paper: Lies and Biased Evaluation: A Real-Effort Experiment (2012) Downloads
Working Paper: Lies and Biased Evaluation: A Real-Effort Experiment (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Lies and Biased Evaluation: A Real-Effort Experiment (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5884

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().

 
Page updated 2019-06-20
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5884