Sabotage in Tournaments: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Loukas Balafoutas, Florian Lindner (florian.r.lindner@hotmail.com) and Matthias Sutter

No 6316, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Many tournaments are plagued by sabotage among competitors. Typically, sabotage is welfare-reducing, but from an individual's perspective an attractive alternative to exerting positive effort. Yet, given its illegal and often immoral nature, sabotage is typically hidden, making it difficult to assess its extent and its victims. Therefore, we use data from Judo World Championships, where a rule change in 2009 basically constituted a natural experiment that introduced one costless opportunity for sabotage. In Judo, competitors can break an opponent's attack in an unsportsmanlike manner; these are seen as acts of sabotage. Based on a unique dataset of 1,422 fights, we find that the rule change in 2009 has led to a large increase in the use of sabotage. Moreover, sabotage is more likely to be employed by relatively less qualified individuals, and to be targeted at more qualified ones. From a survey among spectators, we show that sabotage is welfare-reducing.

Keywords: tournaments; sabotage; Judo; natural experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D03 L83 M51 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2012-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-hrm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (54)

Published - revised version published in: Kyklos, 2012, 65 (4), 425-441

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp6316.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Sabotage in Tournaments: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (2012)
Working Paper: Sabotage in tournaments: Evidence from a natural experiment (2012)
Working Paper: Sabotage in Tournaments: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6316

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
library@iza.org

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte (hinte@iza.org).