Team Structure and the Effectiveness of Collective Performance Pay
Marisa Ratto (),
Emma Tominey () and
Thibaud Vergé ()
No 6747, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
The adoption of performance related pay schemes has become increasingly popular in the public sector of several countries. In the UK, the scheme designers favoured collective performance pay with the aim to foster cooperation across offices. The resulting team structure included several offices (subteams) within the same team, defined by the remuneration scheme. In this paper we analyse the strategic interactions across subteams created by a two-level team structure, in order to assess whether rewarding collective performance necessarily promotes cooperation. We show that such team structure creates conflicting incentives to free-ride across and within subteams. Moreover, the relative size of subteams can be a powerful means to deliver incentives when funds for performance rewards are limited. Using data for one of the incentive schemes piloted in the UK, we analyse the role of the target level and of the relative size of subteams on subteams' performance.
Keywords: incentives; teams performance; sub-teams; cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: M52 M54 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-hrm and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Team Structure and the Effectiveness of Collective Performance Pay (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6747
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().