Self-Selection into Economics Experiments Is Driven by Monetary Rewards
Johannes Abeler and
Daniele Nosenzo
No 7374, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Abstract:
Laboratory experiments have become a wide-spread tool in economic research. Yet, there is still doubt about how well the results from lab experiments generalize to other settings. In this paper, we investigate the self-selection process of potential subjects into the subject pool. We alter the recruitment email sent to first-year students, either mentioning the monetary reward associated with participation in experiments; or appealing to the importance of helping research; or both. We find that the sign-up rate drops by two-thirds if we do not mention monetary rewards. Appealing to subjects' willingness to help research has no effect on sign-up. We then invite the so-recruited subjects to the laboratory to measure a range of preferences in incentivized experiments. We do not find any differences between the three groups. Our results show that student subjects participate in experiments foremost to earn money, and that it is therefore unlikely that this selection leads to an over-estimation of social preferences in the student population.
Keywords: social approval; other-regarding behavior; experimenter demand; laboratory experiment; social preferences; field experiment; selection bias; methodology (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2013-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-dcm, nep-edu, nep-evo and nep-exp
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)
Published - revised version published as 'Self-Selection into Laboratory Experiments: Pro-Social Motives versus Monetary Incentives' in: Experimental Economics, 2015, 18(2), 195-214
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Working Paper: Self-selection into Economics Experiments is Driven by Monetary Rewards (2013) 
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