Strategic Mismatches in Competing Teams

Matthias Kräkel

No 74, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: This paper discusses the strategic role of mismatching, where players voluntarily form inefficient teams or forego the formation of efficient teams, respectively. Strategic mismatching can be rational when players realize a competitive advantage (e.g. harming other competitors). In addition, the results show that free riding can be beneficial for a team in combination with strategic mismatching and that the loser’s curse may be welfare improving by mitigating the problem of strategic mismatching.

Keywords: teams; Economies of scope; tournament; free-rider effect; mismatch (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D21 J41 J44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 1999-11
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Published - published as 'Strategic mismatching and competing teams' in: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2003, 50 (3), 355-372

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