Can You Trust the Good Guys? Trust Within and Between Groups with Different Missions

Sebastian Fehrler and Michael Kosfeld

No 7411, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: NGOs and other non-profit organizations attract workers who strongly identify themselves with their missions. We study whether these "good guys" are more trustworthy and how such pronounced group identities affect trust and trustworthiness within the groups and toward out-groups. We find that subjects who strongly identify themselves with a non-profit mission are more trustworthy in a minimal group setting but also harshly discriminate against out-groups when subjects are grouped by the missions they identify themselves with.

Keywords: discrimination; organization; trustworthiness; trust; group identity; social identity theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 M51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2013-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published - published in: Economics Letters, 2013, 121, 400-404

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Journal Article: Can you trust the good guys? Trust within and between groups with different missions (2013)
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