After the Tournament: Outcomes and Effort Provision

Andrew McGee and Peter McGee

No 7759, IZA Discussion Papers from IZA Network @ LISER

Abstract: Modeling the incentive effects of competitions among employees for promotions or financial rewards, economists have largely ignored the effects of competition on effort provision once the competition is finished. In a laboratory experiment, we examine how competition outcomes affect the provision of post-competition effort. We find that subjects who lose arbitrarily decided competitions choose lower subsequent effort levels than subjects who lose competitions decided by their effort choices. We explore the preferences underlying this behavior and show that subjects' reactions are related to their preferences for meritocratic outcomes.

Keywords: tournaments; counterproductive behavior; promotions; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 D03 J30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 78 pages
Date: 2013-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-sea
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published - published in: Economic Inquiry, 2019, 57 (4), 2125-2146.

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Related works:
Journal Article: AFTER THE TOURNAMENT: OUTCOMES AND EFFORT PROVISION (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7759

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