Are Teams Less Inequality Averse than Individuals?

Haoran He and Marie Claire Villeval

No 8217, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We compare inequality aversion in individuals and teams by means of both within- and between-subject experimental designs, and we investigate how teams aggregate individual preferences. We find that team decisions reveal less inequality aversion than individual initial proposals in team decision-making. However, teams are no more selfish than individuals who decide in isolation. Individuals express strategically more inequality aversion in their initial proposals in team decision-making because they anticipate the selfishness of other members. Members with median social preferences drive team decisions. Finally, we show that social image has little influence because guilt and envy are almost similar in anonymous and non-anonymous interactions.

Keywords: preference aggregation; inequity aversion; team; social image; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 D03 D63 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 48 pages
Date: 2014-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-ltv and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published - revised version published as 'Are group members less inequality averse than individual decision makers?' in: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2017, 138, 111-124.

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Related works:
Working Paper: Are teams less inequality averse than individuals ? (2014)
Working Paper: Are teams less inequality averse than individuals? (2014)
Working Paper: Are teams less inequality averse than individuals? (2014)
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