The Effect of Communication Channels on Promise-Making and Promise-Keeping

Julian Conrads and Tommaso Reggiani ()

No 8534, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: This paper investigates the effect of different communication channels on promise-making and promise-keeping in a helping situation. Four treatments differ with respect to the communication channel employed to solicit unincentivized cooperation, i.e., face-to-face, phone call and two different sorts of computer-mediated communication. The less anonymous (face-to-face, phone) the interpersonal interaction is due to the different communication channels, the higher the propensity of an agent to make a promise. Treatment effects, however, vanish if we then look at the actual promise-keeping rates across treatments as more anonymous channels (computer-mediated) do not perform relatively worse than more direct channels.

Keywords: organizational behavior; experimental economics; communication; promises; behavioral ethics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D02 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2014-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-hrm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published - revised version published in: Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination , 2017, 12 (3), 595-611

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