Cooperation in Diverse Teams: The Role of Temporary Group Membership

Christian Grund, Christine Harbring () and Kirsten Thommes ()
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Christine Harbring: RWTH Aachen University
Kirsten Thommes: University of Paderborn

No 8761, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: In organizations, some team members are assigned to a team for a predefined short period of time, e.g., as they have a temporary contract, while others are permanent members of the same team. In a laboratory experiment we analyze the cooperation levels resulting from diverse teams, where some team members remain with a team and others are switching teams. Our results reveal that teams consisting partly of members with temporary membership display a lower productivity compared to teams of permanent team members only. First, temporary team members cooperate less than permanent team members. Second, individual effort decisions increase with the number of team mates who are of the same type. This second effect holds for both temps and permanents. We argue that social identity is affected by team composition and the individuals' role in a team.

Keywords: public good; economic experiment; cooperation; team (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 M5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2015-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published - considerably shortened version published as 'Public Good Provision in Blended Groups of Partners and Strangers' in: Economics Letters, 2015, 134, 41-44

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