Equality Concerns and the Limits of Self-Governance in Heterogeneous Populations
Nikos Nikiforakis () and
Marie Claire Villeval ()
No 9384, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Mechanisms to overcome social dilemmas provide incentives to maximize efficiency. However, often â€“ such as when agents are heterogeneous â€“ there is a trade-off between efficiency and equality. Agents' concerns for equality in such instances can limit the ability of mechanisms to promote efficiency. We provide evidence for this from a public good experiment using a simple mechanism which allows individuals to communicate periodically with other group members and reward them for their actions. We show that, in homogeneous populations â€“ where there is no tension between efficiency and equality â€“ the mechanism permits group to obtain maximum efficiency. This is not the case in heterogeneous populations where individuals derive different benefits from cooperation. Although almost all heterogeneous groups agree to follow specific contribution rules with positive contributions, most of them either prioritize equality over efficiency or strike a compromise between the two. These findings suggest that equality concerns can impose limits on the ability of heterogeneous populations to reach efficient outcomes through self-governance.
Keywords: heterogeneity; normative conflict; cooperation; rewards; communication (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 H41 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-soc
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Working Paper: Equality concerns and the limits of self-governance in heterogeneous populations (2016)
Working Paper: Equality concerns and the limits of self-governance in heterogeneous populations (2015)
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