Can Reputation Discipline the Gig Economy? Experimental Evidence from an Online Labor Market
Alan Benson (),
Aaron Sojourner () and
Akhmed Umyarov ()
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Akhmed Umyarov: University of Minnesota
No 9501, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
In two experiments, we examine the effects of employer reputation in an online labor market (Amazon Mechanical Turk) in which employers may decline to pay workers while keeping their work product. First, in an audit study of employers by a blinded worker, we find that working only for good employers yields 40% higher wages. Second, in an experiment that varied reputation, we find that good-reputation employers attract work of the same quality but at twice the rate as bad-reputation employers. This is the first clean, field evidence on the value of employer reputation. It can serve as collateral against opportunism in the absence of contract enforcement.
Keywords: labor; personnel; contracts; online labor markets; job search; screening; reputation; online ratings (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L14 M55 J41 J2 L86 D82 K12 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-cta, nep-exp, nep-ict, nep-lma and nep-mkt
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Working Paper: Can Reputation Discipline the Gig Economy? Experimental Evidence from an Online Labor Market (2018)
Working Paper: Can reputation discipline the gig economy? Experimental evidence from an online labor market (2018)
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