Bargaining over Babies: Theory, Evidence, and Policy Implications

Matthias Doepke and Fabian Kindermann

No 9803, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: It takes a woman and a man to make a baby. This fact suggests that for a birth to take place, the parents should first agree on wanting a child. Using newly available data on fertility preferences and outcomes, we show that indeed, babies are likely to arrive only if both parents desire one, and there are many couples who disagree on having babies. We then build a bargaining model of fertility choice and match the model to data from a set of European countries with very low fertility rates. The distribution of the burden of child care between mothers and fathers turns out to be a key determinant of fertility. A policy that lowers the child care burden specifically on mothers can be more than twice as effective at increasing the fertility rate compared to a general child subsidy.

Keywords: child care; bargaining; fertility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 80 pages
Date: 2016-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-eur and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

Published - published in: American Economic Review, 2019, 109 (9), 3264 - 3306

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Related works:
Journal Article: Bargaining over Babies: Theory, Evidence, and Policy Implications (2019)
Working Paper: Bargaining over Babies: Theory, Evidence, and Policy Implications (2016)
Working Paper: Bargaining over Babies: Theory, Evidence, and Policy Implications (2016)
Working Paper: Bargaining over Babies: Theory, Evidence, and Policy Implications (2016)
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