Bargaining over Babies: Theory, Evidence, and Policy Implications

Matthias Doepke and Fabian Kindermann

No 22072, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: It takes a woman and a man to make a baby. This fact suggests that for a birth to take place, the parents should first agree on wanting a child. Using newly available data on fertility preferences and outcomes, we show that indeed, babies are likely to arrive only if both parents desire one. In addition, there are many couples who disagree on having babies, and in low-fertility countries women are much more likely than men to be opposed to having another child. We account for this evidence with a quantitative model of household bargaining in which the distribution of the burden of child care between mothers and fathers is a key determinant of fertility. The model implies that fertility is highly responsive to targeted policies that lower the child care burden specifically for mothers.

JEL-codes: J13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-03
Note: CH EFG
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

Published as Matthias Doepke & Fabian Kindermann, 2019. "Bargaining over Babies: Theory, Evidence, and Policy Implications," American Economic Review, vol 109(9), pages 3264-3306.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w22072.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Bargaining over Babies: Theory, Evidence, and Policy Implications (2019)
Working Paper: Bargaining over Babies: Theory, Evidence, and Policy Implications (2016)
Working Paper: Bargaining over Babies: Theory, Evidence, and Policy Implications (2016)
Working Paper: Bargaining over Babies: Theory, Evidence, and Policy Implications (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22072

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w22072

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().