 Contractual design of contract R&D: state-of-the-art of empirical researchMartin Kloyer () and
Roland Helm
No 05/2007, Jena Research Papers in Business and Economics - Working and Discussion Papers (Expired!) from Friedrich Schiller University Jena, School of Economics and Business Administration Abstract: Due to increasing technological complexity of new product development, Contract R&D becomes more important. However, existence and efficiency of Contract R&D supply relations are endangered by specific mutual opportunism possibilities. We show how empirical contract research, a branch of positive Institutional Economics, identifies effective mechanisms of opportunism control for this kind of supply relations. Thus, we do not only provide an approach of dealing with a highly relevant problem of management of technology and innovation. We also demonstrate the potential of the young and promising discipline of empirical contract research that is able to send valuable impulses to normative Institutional Economics as well as to management practice. Keywords: Contract R&D; positive Institutional Economics; empirical contract research; innovation management (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in: Technology and Innovation Management. Hrsg. v. R. Meckl, M. Rongping und M. Fanchen. Muenchen 2008, S. 151-165. There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jen:jenjbe:2007-05 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Jena Research Papers in Business and Economics - Working and Discussion Papers (Expired!) from Friedrich Schiller University Jena, School of Economics and Business Administration |
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