Present Bias in the Labor Market--When it Pays to be Naive

Matthias Fahn and Regina Seibel ()
Additional contact information
Regina Seibel: University of Zurich

No 2022-04, Economics working papers from Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria

Abstract: We study optimal employment contracts for present-biased employees if firms cannot commit to long-term contracts. Assuming that an employee's effort increases his chances to obtain a future benefit, we show that individuals who are naive about their present bias will actually be better off than sophisticated or time-consistent individuals. Moreover, firms might benefit from being ignorant about the extent of an employee's naiveté. Our results also indicate that naive employees might be harmed by policies such as employment protection or a minimum wage, whereas sophisticated employees are better off.

Keywords: Present bias; labor markets; on-the-job search; moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D90 J31 J32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 52 pages
Date: 2022-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-lma and nep-mic
Note: English
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Present bias in the labor market – when it pays to be naive (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jku:econwp:2022-04

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