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Distributive fairness in an intercultural ultimatum game

Sebastian Goerg, Werner Güth (), Gari Walkowitz () and Torsten Weiland

No 2008-028, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: Does geographic or (perceived) social distance between subjects signi?cantly affect proposer and responder behavior in ultimatum bargaining? To answer this question, subjects once play an ultimatum game with three players (proposer, responder, and dummy player) and asymmetric information (only the proposer knows what can be distributed). Treatments differ in their geographical scope in that they involve either one or three subject pools which, in the latter case, structurally differ in their between-subject pool heterogeneity. Observed choice behavior corroborates several stylized facts of this class of ultimatum games which are primarily explained by strategic play and other-regarding preferences. While the extent of self-interested allocation behavior in proposers signi?cantly varies across sites, neither proposers nor responders meaningfully condition their choices on their co-players' provenance or affiliation. Altogether, we do not discern articulate discriminative behavior based on geographic or social distance.

Keywords: Equity; fairness; social preferences; ultimatum bargaining; redistribution; cross-national experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C91 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-03-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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