Intra-firm Conflicts and Interfirm Competition

Werner Güth (), Kerstin Pull and Manfred Stadler

No 2009-007, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: We study interaction effects between intra-firm conflicts and interfirm competition on a duopolistic market with seller firms employing one or more agents and implementing tournament incentives. We show that inter-firm competition leads to higher incentive intensity, higher efforts and output levels but lower profits.

Keywords: Tournament; Worker compensation; Strategic competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 L22 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-01-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-cse, nep-cta and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://oweb.b67.uni-jena.de/Papers/jerp2009/wp_2009_007.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Intrafirm conflicts and interfirm competition (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2009-007

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Markus Pasche ().