Co-employment of permanently and temporarily employed agents

Werner Güth (), Martin Kocher and Vera Popova
Additional contact information
Vera Popova: Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Postal: Kahlaische Straße 10, D-07745 Jena, Germany
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Vera Angelova

No 2010-016, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: One-shot interaction and repeated interaction often co-exist in the real world. We study possible behavioral effects of this co-existence in a principal-agent setting, in which a principal simultaneously employs a permanent and a temporary agent. Our experimental results indicate that there is "discrimination" between the two agents and that the available information for agents determines the extent of this discrimination, even though the theoretical solution of the game implies equal treatment of agents. Discrimination is, thus, a consequence of reciprocity. Agents that are discriminated against react negatively by withholding effort.

Keywords: principal-agent problem; permanent and temporary employment; fairness; wage discrimination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D21 J31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-03-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Co-employment of permanently and temporarily employed agents (2012)
Working Paper: Co-employment of permanently and temporarily employed agents (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2010-016

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