An ultimatum game with multidimensional response strategies

Werner Güth (), Maria Levati, Chiara Nardi and Ivan Soraperra

No 2014-018, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: We enrich the choice task of responders in ultimatum games by allow- ing them to independently decide whether to collect what is offered to them and whether to destroy what the proposer demanded. Such a multidimensional response format intends to cast further light on the motives guiding responder behavior. Using a conservative and strin- gent approach to type classification, we find that the overwhelming majority of responder participants choose consistently with outcome- based preference models. There are, however, few responders that destroy the proposer's demand of a large pie share and concurrently reject their own offer, thereby suggesting a strong concern for integrity.

Keywords: Ultimatum; Social preferences; Incomplete information; Experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D63 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-08-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-hpe
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Working Paper: An ultimatum game with multidimensional response strategies (2014)
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