Let the Dummy Talk! - Unilateral Communication and Discrimination in Three-Person Dictator Experiments -

Ben Greiner, Werner GÑŒth and Ro'i Zultan
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Werner Güth ()

No 18, Working Paper Series in Economics from University of Cologne, Department of Economics

Abstract: To explain why pre-play communication increases cooperation in games, one refers to a) strategic causes such as efficient communication or reputation effects, and b) changes in the utilities due to social processes. Hitherto experimental support for both explanations is mixed and confounded. Our experimental design eliminates all strategic factors and allows to focus on the effects of communication processes. We clearly find social effects, but none of revealed anonymity or salient communication. The social processes invoked are very heterogeneous but not irregular for different communicators.

Keywords: bargaining; communication; social utility; n-persons dictator game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-07-30
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Social communication and discrimination: a video experiment (2012)
Working Paper: Social Communication and Discrimination: A Video Experiment (2010)
Working Paper: Let the Dummy Talk! - Unilateral Communication and Discrimination in Three-Person Dictator Experiments - (2005)
Working Paper: Let the Dummy Talk! Unilateral Communication and Discrimination in Three-Person Dictator Experiments (2005)
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