Surprising Gifts - Theory and Laboratory Evidence

Kiryl Khalmetski, Axel Ockenfels and Peter Werner

No 61, Working Paper Series in Economics from University of Cologne, Department of Economics

Abstract: People do not only feel guilt from not living up to others' expectations (Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007)), but may also like to exceed them. We propose a model that generalizes the guilt aversion model to capture the possibility of positive surprises when making gifts. A model extension allows decision makers to care about others' attribution of intentions behind surprises. We test the model in two dictator game experiments. Experiment 1 shows a strong causal effect of recipients' expectations on dictators' transfers. Moreover, in line with our model, the correlation between transfers and expectations can be both, positive and negative, obscuring the effect in the aggregate. Experiment 2 shows that dictators care about what recipients know about the intentions behind surprises.

Keywords: guilt aversion; surprise seeking; dictator game; consensus effect (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-05-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Surprising gifts: Theory and laboratory evidence (2015)
Working Paper: Surprising Gifts: Theory and Laboratory Evidence (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kls:series:0061

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