Does being Elected Increase Subjective Entitlements? Evidence from the Laboratory

Arne Robert Weiss () and Irenaeus Wolff
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Arne Robert Weiss: Department of Economics, University of Köln, Germany

No 2013-19, Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz from Department of Economics, University of Konstanz

Abstract: In Geng, Weiss, and Woff (2011), we pointed to the possibility that a voting mechanism may create or strengthen an entitlement effect in political-power holders relative to a random-appointment mechanism. This comment documents that such an effect, if it exists, is not robust.

Keywords: Elections; Electoral Campaigns; Dictator Game; Social Distance; Entitlement; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D03 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 5 pages
Date: 2013-10-31
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Does being elected increase subjective entitlements? Evidence from the laboratory (2013)
Working Paper: Does being elected increase subjective entitlements? Evidence from the laboratory (2013)
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