Does being elected increase subjective entitlements? Evidence from the laboratory

Arne Robert Weiss and Irenaeus Wolff

No 82, TWI Research Paper Series from Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz

Abstract: In Geng, Weiss, and Wolff (2011), we pointed to the possibility that a voting mechanism may create or strengthen an entitlement effect in political-power holders relative to a random-appointment mechanism. This comment documents that such an effect, if it exists, is not robust.

Keywords: Elections; Electoral campaigns; Dictator game; Social distance; Entitlement; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Journal Article: Does being elected increase subjective entitlements? Evidence from the laboratory (2013)
Working Paper: Does being Elected Increase Subjective Entitlements? Evidence from the Laboratory (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:twi:respas:0082

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