Does being elected increase subjective entitlements? Evidence from the laboratory

Arne Weiss () and Irenaeus Wolff
Additional contact information
Arne Weiss: University of Cologne

Economics Bulletin, 2013, vol. 33, issue 1, 794-796

Abstract: In Geng, Weiss, and Wolff (2011), we pointed to the possibility that a voting mechanism may create or strengthen an entitlement effect in political-power holders relative to a random-appointment mechanism. This comment documents that such an effect, if it exists, is not robust.

Keywords: Elections; Electoral campaigns; Dictator game; Social distance; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-03-18
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2013/Volume33/EB-13-V33-I1-P77.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Does being Elected Increase Subjective Entitlements? Evidence from the Laboratory (2013)
Working Paper: Does being elected increase subjective entitlements? Evidence from the laboratory (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-13-00011

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().