A model of strategic delegation in contests between groups

Stefan Brandauer and Florian Englmaier

Munich Reprints in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: We analyze a contest between two groups where group members have differing valuations for the contested rent. Generically the pivotal group member with the median valuation of the rent will not act himself but will want to send a group member that has preferences different to her own into the contest. The delegation can be either to more or less "radical" group members. The direction of delegation depends on the order of moves and the relative "aggressiveness" of the group medians. We show that almost certainly very asymmetric equilibria arise, even if the median group members value the rent (almost) equally. Delegation can lead to a social improvement in terms of resources spent in the contest. © Springer-Verlag 2008.

Date: 2009
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Review of Economic Design 3 13(2009): pp. 205-232

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: A model of strategic delegation in contests between groups (2009)
Working Paper: A Model of Strategic Delegation in Contests between Groups (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lmu:muenar:22028

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Munich Reprints in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics Ludwigstr. 28, 80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tamilla Benkelberg ().