A Model of Strategic Delegation in Contests between Groups

Stefan Brandauer and Florian Englmaier

No 1654, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We analyze a contest between two groups where group members have differing valuations for the contested rent. Generically the pivotal group member with the median valuation of the rent will not act himself but will want to send a group member that has preferences different to her own into the contest. The delegation can be either to more or less 'radical' group members. The direction of delegation depends on the order of moves and the relative 'aggressiveness' of the group medians. We show that almost certainly very asymmetric equilibria arise, even if the median group members value the rent (almost) equally. Delegation can lead to a social improvement in terms of resources spent in the contest.

Keywords: strategic delegation; contests; rent seeking; political economy; arms races; distributional conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D40 D72 D73 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: A model of strategic delegation in contests between groups (2009)
Working Paper: A model of strategic delegation in contests between groups (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1654

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