The alliance formation puzzle and capacity constraints

Kai Konrad and Dan Kovenock

Munich Reprints in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: The formation of an alliance in conflict situations is known to suffer from a collective action problem and from the potential of internal conflict. We show that budget constraints of an intermediate size can overcome this strong disadvantage and explain the formation of alliances. © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

JEL-codes: D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (38)

Published in Economics Letters 2 103(2009): pp. 84-86

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Related works:
Journal Article: The alliance formation puzzle and capacity constraints (2009)
Working Paper: The Alliance Formation Puzzle and Capacity Constraints (2008)
Working Paper: The Alliance Formation Puzzle and Capacity Constraints (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lmu:muenar:22083

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