The Alliance Formation Puzzle and Capacity Constraints

Dan Kovenock and Kai Konrad

No 6741, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: The formation of an alliance in conflict situations is known to suffer from a collective action problem and from the potential of internal conflict. We show that budget constraints of an intermediate size can overcome this strong disadvantage and explain the formation of alliances.

Keywords: Alliance formation puzzle; Budget constraints; Military conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The alliance formation puzzle and capacity constraints (2009)
Working Paper: The alliance formation puzzle and capacity constraints (2009)
Working Paper: The Alliance Formation Puzzle and Capacity Constraints (2008)
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