The alliance formation puzzle and capacity constraints

Die Rolle von Kapazitätsgrenzen für die Vorteilhaftigkeit von Allianzen

Kai Konrad and Dan Kovenock

Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance from WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Abstract: The formation of an alliance in conflict situations is known to suffer from a collective action problem and from the potential of internal conflict. We show that budget constraints of an intermediate size can overcome this strong disadvantage and explain the formation of alliances.

Keywords: Alliance formation puzzle; military conflict; budget constraints (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The alliance formation puzzle and capacity constraints (2009)
Working Paper: The alliance formation puzzle and capacity constraints (2009)
Working Paper: The Alliance Formation Puzzle and Capacity Constraints (2008)
Working Paper: The Alliance Formation Puzzle and Capacity Constraints (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wzbmpg:spii200807

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