Coordination under threshold uncertainty in a public goods game

Astrid Dannenberg, Andreas L�schel, Gabriele Paolacci, Christiane Reif and Alessandro Tavoni ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Andreas Löschel

No 64, GRI Working Papers from Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment

Abstract: We explored experimentally how threshold uncertainty affects coordination success in a threshold public goods game. Whereas all groups succeeded in providing the public good when the exact value of the threshold was known, uncertainty was generally detrimental for the public good provision. The negative effect of threshold uncertainty was particularly severe when it took the form of ambiguity, i.e. when players were not only unaware of the value of the threshold but also of its probability distribution. Early signaling of willingness to contribute and share the burden equitably helped groups in coping with threshold uncertainty.

Date: 2011-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Coordination under threshold uncertainty in a public goods game (2011)
Working Paper: Coordination under threshold uncertainty in a public goods game (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lsg:lsgwps:wp64

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