Coordination under threshold uncertainty in a public goods game

Astrid Dannenberg, Andreas Löschel, Gabriele Paolacci, Christiane Reif and Alessandro Tavoni ()

No 11-065, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Abstract: We explored experimentally how threshold uncertainty affects coordination success in a threshold public goods game. Whereas all groups succeeded in providing the public good when the exact value of the threshold was known, uncertainty was generally detrimental for the public good provision. The negative effect of threshold uncertainty was particularly severe when it took the form of ambiguity, i.e. when players were not only unaware of the value of the threshold but also of its probability distribution. Early signaling of willingness to contribute and share the burden equitably helped groups in coping with threshold uncertainty.

Keywords: Public good; threshold uncertainty; ambiguity; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 H41 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Coordination under threshold uncertainty in a public goods game (2011)
Working Paper: Coordination under threshold uncertainty in a public goods game (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:11065

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