Fee-Setting Mechanisms: On Optimal Pricing by Intermediaries and Indirect Taxation

Simon Loertscher & Andras Niedermayer
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Andras F. Niedermayer and Simon Loertscher

No 1162, Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from The University of Melbourne

Abstract: Mechanisms according to which private intermediaries or governments charge transaction fees or indirect taxes are prevalent in practice. We consider a setup with multiple buyers and sellers and two-sided independent private information about valuations. We show that any weighted average of revenue and social welfare can be maximized through appropriately chosen transaction fees and that in increasingly thin markets such optimal fees converge to linear fees. Moreover, fees decrease with competition (or the weight on welfare) and the elasticity of supply but decrease with the elasticity of demand. Our theoretical predictions fit empirical observations in several industries with intermediaries.

Keywords: brokers; applied mechanism design; linear commission fees; optimal indirect (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 59 pages
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Fee-Setting Mechanisms: On Optimal Pricing by Intermediaries and Indirect Taxation (2014)
Working Paper: Fee-Setting Mechanisms: On Optimal Pricing by Intermediaries and Indirect Taxation (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mlb:wpaper:1162

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