How do people play a repeated trust game?: Experimental evidence
Fabian Bornhorst (),
Oliver Kirchkamp (),
Karl Schlag () and
Eyal Winter ()
No 04-43, Papers from Sonderforschungsbreich 504
We run an experiment that implements a finitely repeated version of the trust game in which players can choose in each period with whom to interact. Change in trust and trustworthiness in terms of previous experience is statistically investigated where confounding factors are controlled for. Motives such as reinforcement learning, reciprocity and rationality are useful to explain findings. Overall we find a high persistence of choice and uncover more trust and trustworthiness than in the one shot experiments. Towards the end of the game the degree of trust and trustworthiness decline.
Keywords: economic experiments; reciprocity; reinforcement learning; trust (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D83 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: How do People Play a Repeated Trust Game? Experimental Evidence (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mnh:spaper:2699
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