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How do People Play a Repeated Trust Game? Experimental Evidence

Fabian Bornhorst (), Andrea Ichino, Oliver Kirchkamp (), Karl Schlag () and Eyal Winter ()

No 04-43, Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications from Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim

Abstract: We run an experiment that implements a finitely repeated version of the trust game in which players can choose in each period with whom to interact. Change in trust and trustworthiness in terms of previous experience is statistically investigated where confounding factors are controlled for. Motives such as reinforcement learning, reciprocity and rationality are useful to explain findings. Overall we find a high persistence of choice and uncover more trust and trustworthiness than in the one shot experiments. Towards the end of the game the degree of trust and trustworthiness decline.

Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2004-03-10
Note: Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504, at the University of Mannheim, and from the Research Council of the EUI is gratefully acknowledged.
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